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Tools of the Trade
Prior experience as a stimulus category confound:
an example using facial expressions of emotion
Leah H. Somerville and Paul J. Whalen
Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA
Facial expressions of emotion represent a stimulus set widely used to assess a broad range of psychological processes.
However, a consideration of systematic differences between expression categories, other than differences relating to
characteristics of the expressions themselves, has remained largely unaddressed. By collecting experience rankings in a large
sample of undergraduates, we observed that the amount of reported experience individuals have had with different facial
expressions of emotion systematically differed between all expression categories. These findings shed light on the potential for
identifying confounds inherent to comparing some stimulus categories and, in this case, may aid in the interpretation of observed
between-expression category findings.
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Humans comprise an especially challenging subject pool
precisely because we as experimenters lack the ability to
control their prior experiences, a form of control that is
more readily employed in animal studies. As Tolman put it,
‘rats live in cages; they do not go on binges the night before
one has planned the experiment’ (Tolman, 1945, p. 166).
Cognitive neuroscientists have devised clever experimental
manipulations that have offered important insights into the
neural substrates of everything from memory and attention
to mood and moral reasoning. But given the experientially
‘tainted’ nature of our subjects of study, careful consider-
ation should be given to whether prior experience differs
systematically between any two experimental comparison
conditions. To this end, the current report summarizes and
discusses one such instance from the realm of affective
neuroscience, namely, differential prior experience with
primary emotional facial expression categories.
Images depicting facial expressions of emotion comprise
standardized stimulus sets that are frequently employed to
assess a wide range of psychological functions (e.g. Ekman
and Friesen, 1976; Russell, 1994). While one can question the
ecological validity of presenting subjects with static 2D
images of expressions, a vast amount of useful and replicable
data have been gleaned from these stimuli. However,
a consideration of systematic differences between expression
categories, other than differences relating to characteristics
of the expressions themselves, has remained largely
unaddressed.
Psychologists studying emotion have long pointed out
that as important as fear states are, they are relatively rare
events (Cannon, 1927). William James summarized the issue
as follows: ‘The progress from brute to man is characterized
by nothing so much as by the decrease in frequency of
proper occasions for fear’ (James, 1890, p. 415). If it is true
that we experience the feeling of fear less often than other
emotions, then it follows that we would see fearful
expressions on the faces of others less often than other
expressions over the course of our lifetime (Bond and Siddle,
1996; Whalen, 1998). Such a familiarity bias would be
an important caveat to consider when interpreting depen-
dent measurements associated with responses to fearful
facial expressions in comparison to other more frequently
encountered expressions. Accordingly, the current report
characterizes the past experience individuals report having
with distinct primary expression categories in their lifetimes.
METHODS
Subjects were 1537 undergraduate students tested in groups
of 200. All procedures were conducted in accordance
with the Institutional Review Board of the University
of Wisconsin. After excluding improperly ranked surveys,
1393 usable subjects remained, consisting of 774 females and
619 males. Subjects were presented with a list of the six
primary facial expression labels (Ekman and Friesen, 1976)
and the neutral expression label, and were instructed to rank
order these seven expression labels based upon the frequency
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with which they believed they had encountered these
expressions in their lifetimes (1¼ seen the most, 7¼ seen
the least). To increase clarity, two words were presented
together to describe each expression category.
RESULTS
Label, mean ranking and standard deviation (in
parentheses) of rankings for each expression label were as
follows: happy/smiling: 1.86 (1.26); neutral/expressionless:
2.27 (1.75); sad/unhappy: 3.65 (1.25); angry/mad: 4.03
(1.29); surprised/startled: 4.89 (1.52); disgusted/yuck: 5.37
(1.40) and fearful/afraid: 5.93 (1.33). A Friedman rank test
for related samples yielded a significant main effect for
expression, indicating that the distributions of ranks differed
across expression XF
2(6)¼ 4218.26, P< 0.001, r¼ 0.87).
These ranking distributions are presented as a frequency
histogram by expression in Figure 1. Given the significant
omnibus effect, Wilcoxon signed rank tests were performed
on each pair of neighboring expressions to determine
whether the distributions of ranks differed significantly
from one another. Reported results are corrected for
multiple comparisons, and effect size (r) is denoted after
significance values. The distributions of all neighboring pairs
differed significantly from one another: happy/neutral:
Z¼ 4.92, P< 0.0001, r¼ 0.132; neutral/sad: Z¼ 19.15,
P< 0.0001, r¼ 0.51; sad/angry: Z¼ 7.85, P< 0.0001,
r¼ 0.21; angry/surprise: Z¼ 13.28, P< 0.0001, r¼ 0.36;
surprise/disgust: Z¼ 8.09, P< 0.0001, r¼ 0.22; disgust/fear:
Z¼ 85.45, P< 0.0001, r¼ 0.29. Separate analyses of male
and female subjects produced the same ranked order of
expressions.
DISCUSSION
Here we define the pattern of reported differential prior
experience with distinct facial expressions of emotion in
a large sample of undergraduates. Rank position was
significantly different between all adjacently ranked expres-
sion categories, with fearful expressions consistently reported
as having been seen the least in one’s lifetime, and happy
expressions being seen the most. These data offer a caution
for behavioral and neuroimaging studies seeking to compare
responses to one expression with that of another, and more
generally to any experimental paradigm involving conditions
where stimuli fundamentally differ on the dimension of
prior experience.
Here we consider the specific example of amygdala
reactivity to human faces. In human neuroimaging studies,
fearful facial expressions evoke greater responsivity in the
amygdala compared to neutral or happy expressions (Morris
et al., 1996; Whalen et al., 1998), consistent with the notion
that the amygdala responds to fearful faces more because
they have predicted negative outcomes in the past. The
present report raises the possibility that greater amygdala
reactivity to fearful faces might also reflect a heightened
response to an environmental stimulus that has been
encountered less frequently in one’s lifetime. Such a notion
would be consistent with experimental findings showing that
the amygdala is more responsive to novel compared to
familiar faces (DuBois et al., 1999; Schwartz et al., 2003;
Wright et al., 2003).
While the present results have specific implications for
interpreting data that vary across facial expression categories,
they imply that for any measured difference between facial
categories, one should consider the possible confound of
prior life experience. For example, greater amygdala activity
has been reported in Caucasian-American subjects while
viewing unfamiliar African-American faces than unfamiliar
Caucasian-American faces (Hart et al., 2000; Phelps et al.,
2000; Cunningham et al., 2004), which could be attributed
to the relative novelty of African-American faces to
Caucasian-American subjects (but see Lieberman et al.,
2005). Supporting this possibility is a study by Phelps et al.
(2000) that attempted to equate novelty of different race
faces by using only pictures of highly familiar, famous
Caucasian-American and African-Americans, and found
comparable amygdala activity to the two stimulus conditions
(Phelps et al., 2000). Further, while amygdala activation to
African-American faces has been shown to vary with scores
on the Implicit Association Task (IAT; Greenwald et al.,
1998), a purported measure of implicit racism, it is possible
to interpret IAT effects in terms of familiarity, where
reaction time biases track categories that have been
encountered more frequently (Rothermund and Wentura,
2004; Kinoshita and Peek-O’Leary, 2005).
Within the specific example of facial expression categories,
some experimental designs have eliminated this alternative
explanation by utilizing paradigms that manipulated other
Fig. 1 Distributions of experience rankings with seven facial expressions of emotion. Distributions are ordered from left to right according to frequency ranking (1¼ seen the
most, 7¼ seen the least). Y-axis denotes frequency.
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aspects of the face presentation, such as eye gaze (Adams and
Kleck, 2003), while holding facial expression itself constant.
For example, a neuroimaging study by Kim et al. (2004)
used a paradigm employing only surprised faces while
manipulating the valence of contextual information describ-
ing these faces. The resulting neural activity observed
reflected differences in the interpretation of valence asso-
ciated with these expressions (as a function of context) and
could not be explained by the differences in experience
reported here (see also Adams et al., 2003).
In addition, differential prior experience with facial
expression categories would likely influence recognition
difficulty. For example, labeling accuracy for the facial
expressions depicted in the Pictures of Facial Affect (Ekman
and Friesen, 1976), a commonly used facial expression
stimulus set, is best for happy expressions (95–98%
agreement) and worst for fearful expressions (77–87%
agreement) (Ekman and Friesen, 1976; Russell, 1994).
Although cross-cultural studies indicate that accuracy
decreases when judging emotions of faces in other cultures,
happiness and fear are still the most and the least accurately
identified, respectively (for a review, see Elfenbein and
Ambady, 2002). These data resonate with expression
labelling accuracy rates observed in brain-damaged patients,
in that negative expressions are consistently labelled less
accurately than positive expressions (Braun et al., 2005;
Broks et al., 1998; Rapcsak et al., 2000; Rosen et al., 2006).
It should be noted that these data rely on subjects’ ability
to accurately quantify this facet of past experience. These
findings would be supplemented by additional studies
assessing the incidence of observed expressions across a
number of real-life social settings (see Bond and Siddle, 1996
for preliminary data that address this issue). In addition,
it would be useful to determine whether the same ranked
order would be found using different eliciting stimuli
(e.g. different category labels, using faces rather than verbal
labels as items to rank), and other formats of evaluation such
as use of a Likert scale or free response format. Indeed, a free
response format (rather than the forced choice format)
might reveal other experienced expression categories not
considered here, such as social emotions like embarrassment
(Keltner and Buswell, 1997).
In the future, the employment of this scale could provide
insight into the psychological state of the individual, or
group, of interest. An individual’s rank ordering, if abnormal
with respect to an overall sample, could be related
to differences in one’s past experiences and/or be
predictive of certain personality traits or tendencies toward
psychopathology. For example, a small minority of our
sample rated sad faces as being seen the most. Future studies
could aim to show that such a response relates to symptoms
of depression, since prior research has demonstrated a
tendency for depressed individuals to over-ascribe sad
emotion to faces (Gur et al., 1992). A similarly small
number of subjects rated angry faces as being seen the most.
Such a response could be shown to be related to experiences
during one’s upbringing, given that individuals raised in an
abusive or neglectful environment ascribe anger in a
presented face at a lower threshold (Pollak and Sinha, 2002).
Numerous studies have demonstrated robust differences
in behavioral and psychophysiological response to these
primary facial expression categories. The present demonstra-
tion that these categories differ based upon reported past
experience further complicates the interpretation of observed
between-category findings. Our hope is that further research
on this issue will lead to an improved understanding of these
ubiquitously employed stimuli, as well as our processing of
these primary expression categories. More generally, these
data suggest that differential past experience will be an
important variable to consider when comparing different
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